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“A thing is not necessarily either true or false; it can be both 
true and false” (Harold Pinter, Nobel Prize Discourse 2005). 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
In this paper we shall present some benefits of semantic minimalism. In particular, we shall 
stress how minimalism allows us to avoid cognitive overloading, in that (i) it does not posit 
hidden indexicals or variables at the LF or representational level and (ii) it does not posit the 
operation of free enrichment processes when we produce or hear a sentence. 
 We shall nonetheless argue that a fully adequate semantic minimalism should embrace a 
form of relativism—that is, the view that semantic content must be evaluated, pace Cappelen 
and Lepore, vis-à-vis a given situation, the latter being a fragment of a possible world or a 
partial world. In so doing we shall show how Cappelen and Lepore damage the insight of 
semantic minimalism insofar as they insist that the (minimal) semantic content should be 
evaluated with respect to a whole possible world. This move fails to capture the powerful 
contextualist intuition that it does not make much sense to evaluate the content of, say, Naomi 
is rich, or Jon is tall, with respect to, for instance, the actual world (ignoring standards of 
evaluation or situations). 
 To deal with this kind of worry, Cappelen and Lepore appeal to speech-act pluralism: 
they claim that whatever work is done by contextual parameters can be done by adding a 
proposition to the set of propositions expressed by the utterance. For instance, someone can 
utter “Pierre is tall” to mean that Pierre is tall for a Frenchman, which is a way of saying that 
the proposition that Pierre is tall for a Frenchman is one of the many propositions which are 
pragmatically expressed by the utterance. In our view, this strategy fails insofar as it forces 
internalizing and making explicit something that may be given but not represented in the 
situation of the utterance. 
 In contrast to some forms of radical relativism—e.g. the position recently put forward by 
MacFarlane (2003, 2005)—though, we shall argue that there is a privileged or default 
situation relative to which the minimal semantic content should be evaluated. This privileged 
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situation is fixed by cognitive facts concerning speakers and hearers, but also by non-
cognitive relations between the grasp of content and the world. 
 
1. The Essence of Minimalism 
 
As we understand it, semantic minimalism is the view that: (i) an utterance u of a 
(declarative) sentence S expresses a proposition p whose constituents must all be 
represented by elements of S; (ii) the structure of p reflects the logical form of S,1 and 
(iii) if S does not contain indexical expressions, u expresses p in a context-
independent way. This last claim can be illustrated in considering: 
 
(1) Jon is tall 
(2) Melons are red 
 
Utterances of (1) and (2) express the propositions that Jon is tall and that melons are 
red regardless of the context in which the sentences (1) and (2) are uttered. This 
amounts to saying that all utterances of (1) and (2) express the very same proposition, 
i.e., that Jon is tall and that melons are red respectively. 
 We shall not distinguish here between propositions and truth conditions; in our 
terminology, propositions are just truth conditions.2 Semantic minimalists claim that 
propositions are invariant across contexts. If they are right, then truth conditions are 
also, by definition, invariant across contexts. As we shall see, the crucial question is 
whether the truth-values of propositions can vary within a given possible world. If the 
answer to this question is positive, then propositions (or truth conditions) determine 
truth-values only relative to partial situations. For instance, the proposition that Jon is 
tall may be true relative to one particular situation but false relative to another, even 
within the same possible world. As will become clear, part of our argument is that the 
mistake of so-called indexicalism and contextualism is that they unduly transform 
intuitions about variable truth-values into intuitions about variable truth conditions or 
propositions. 
 Minimalists need not deny, though, that some (unambiguous) sentences may 
express some propositions only relative to a given context. Jane’s utterance of: 
 
(3) I am tall 
                                                 
1 A proposition’s structure should reflect, for instance, the difference between propositions expressed 
by sentences like “Jon loves Mary” and “Mary loves Jon”. The constituents of the propositions 
expressed are exactly the same, i.e. Jon, Mary and the loving relation. Yet the order, and thus the 
meaning of the sentences, differs. This should be reflected in the structure of the proposition. For the 
sake and simplicity of our argument, we shall concentrate only on the propositional constituents insofar 
as the main debate among the various theories we shall discuss turns around the propositional 
constituents. 
2 Cappelen and Lepore (2005: 3 note 3) note that minimalism can be spelled out either in terms of 
propositions or in terms of truth conditions. One issue, which goes beyond the scope of this paper, is 
whether talk of constituents and their being represented by elements of a sentence survives eschewing 
propositions for truth conditions. 
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expresses the proposition that Jane is tall. If (3) is uttered by Jon, it expresses the 
proposition that Jon is tall. Both Jane and Jon utter the same sentence, yet they 
express different propositions. The same is true with an utterance of: 
 
(4) This melon is red 
 
When the relevant designated melon is—to give it a name—Plug, it expresses the 
proposition that Plug is red, while if the relevant melon is Plum it expresses the 
proposition that Plum is red. In short, minimalists recognize that some sentences, i.e.  
those containing indexicals, express a proposition only relative to the context in which 
the sentence is uttered. When an indexical expression appears in an utterance there is 
a mandatory process triggered by the linguistic meaning of the indexical expression 
which requires appeal to some contextual features in order to fix the value of the 
indexical expression and, therefore, to determine the propositional constituent. This 
reflects Kaplan’s (1977) famous distinction between character and content: the 
character of an indexical (its linguistic meaning) can be represented by a function 
taking as argument the context and giving as value the semantic content. If we follow 
Cappelen and Lepore, the class of indexical expressions is limited to the list 
mentioned by Kaplan (1977). This list contains only expressions like the pronouns 
“I”, “s/he”, “we”, …, the demonstratives “this”, “that”, “these”, …, the adverbs 
“here”, “now”, “tomorrow”, …. Roughly, an indexical is an expression whose 
linguistic meaning directs us to some aspect of context in order to fix the reference. 
Thus, “I” directs us to the agent of the utterance, while “she” directs us to the relevant 
female demonstrated by an utterance of “she”. If the linguistic meaning of an 
expression does not direct us to some contextual aspects this expression cannot be 
classified as an indexical. It is thus context insensitive and the semantic value of an 
utterance of this expression will always be the same, regardless of the context in 
which it occurs. In other words, an expression is context sensitive inasmuch as its 
semantic value can vary from context to context. It is as simple as that. Since the 
semantic value of an expression like “I”, “now”, “she”, etc. can vary from context to 
context, these expressions are context sensitive. On the other hand, on the assumption 
that the semantic value of expressions like “red”, “tall”, “ready”, does not vary from 
context to context, these expressions are context insensitive. The semantic value of 
“red”, for instance, does not vary whether it applies to tomatoes, London buses, or 
Ian’s hair. Tomatoes, London buses and Ian’s hair all have something in common: 
they are all red (whatever being red turns out to be). In a nutshell, “red” does not pick 
out a property in one context and another property in another context, i.e., it does not 
pick out one property when applied to London buses and another when it applies to 
tomatoes, likewise  for “tall” and “ready”.3 
                                                 
3 One could argue that just as there is nothing in the linguistic meaning of “tall” which could orient the 
hearer to the relevant standard of tallness, there is nothing in the code meaning of “now” or “here” that 
orients the hearer to the temporal/spatial extent of the time/location referred to. The same with “s/he”: 
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 The distinction between indexical expressions—and thus context-sensitivity 
linguistically triggered—and non-indexical ones also shows up in relation to what 
intuitively counts as understanding of an utterance. One does not understand an 
utterance containing an indexical expression if one does not identify the referent of 
the indexical expression, while one can understand an utterance deprived of indexical 
expression without engaging in a process of identification. Hence, one does not 
understand an utterance like “I am ready” or “This is red” if one does not identify the 
referent of ‘I’ and ‘this’. On the other hand, one can understand an utterance of 
“Aristotle is a philosopher” or “Jane is ready” even if one does not know who 
Aristotle was or what Jane is ready for. More on this later on. 
 
 
2. Indexicalism and Contextualism 
 
It may be worth mentioning that some people contest the view that the class of 
indexical expressions is limited to the ones we enumerated. Some go so far as to 
claim that proper names are indexicals as well (see, for instance, Burge 1973, 
Recanati 1993, Voltolini 1995, Pelczar and Rainsbury 1998). Others claim that 
comparative adjectives such as “rich”, “small”, … (see Stanley 2000, Richard 2004), 
quantified expressions like “the book”, “some students”, … (see Stanley and Szabo 
2000), common nouns like “local”, “foreigner”, “enemy”, … (see Partee 1989, 
Condoravdi and Gawron 1986, Vallée 2003) are context sensitive expressions as well. 
A common strategy to represent their context sensitivity is to posit a variable working 
like a hidden indexical at the level of logical form (see Partee 1989, Condoravdi and 
Gavron 1986, Stanley 2000, Stanley and Szabo 2000).4 This view can be labelled 
                                                                                                                                            
nothing in their code meaning orients the hearer to a specific individual. We maintain that there is a 
difference in the linguistic meaning of “tall” and the linguistic meaning of “now/here”. Although the 
temporal/spatial extent of “now/here” may vary from utterance to utterance their linguistic meaning (or 
character) operates on a specific time/location to select the relevant extension. Think for instance of 
“we”: nothing in its linguistic meaning tells us how many individuals must enter its extension. Yet its 
linguistic meaning forces the agent to be part of its semantic value. As for “s/he” their linguistic 
meaning is incomplete and suggests that the value is also determined by the accompanying 
demonstration or directing intention (see Kaplan 1977 and 1989). On the other hand, nothing in the 
linguistic meaning of a word like “tall” directs us to a comparative class. All its linguistic meaning 
suggests is something along “more than the average height” (cf. The New Shorter Oxford English 
Dictionary) without suggesting that a standard of comparison should be part of its extension. 
4 It may be worth noticing that unlike Cappelen and Lepore (2005: 1 note 1) we believe that context 
sensitivity expands to other terms (often called contextuals) as well. Among these terms we have: 
“foreigner”, “local”, “enemy”, “exported”, “national”, and the like—that is, terms whose literal 
meaning suggests that their value also depends on the context in which they are uttered. Someone is an 
enemy or a foreigner only relative to someone else or some other country: our enemy can be your 
friend, while one may be a foreigner in France but not in Canada. On the other hand, something can be 
said to be red, or blue, regardless of the substance/thing to which the term applies. However, whether 
or not one ultimately includes contextuals in the list of context sensitive expressions does not affect the 
contextualist-minimalist debate and, most importantly, does not undermine minimalism. We can 
propose some criteria for distinguishing contextual terms from non-contextual terms. The former, 
unlike the latter, for instance, can work anaphorically and can be bound. In “All around England most 
Arsenal supporters got drunk because after the final a local bar was selling cheap alcohol”, “local” is 
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indexicalism insofar as it explains, to borrow Recanati’s terminology, contextual 
dependence in terms of saturation rather than enrichment. Saturation, unlike (free) 
enrichment, is a mandatory contextual process. As such, saturation is triggered by an 
indexical expression working either at the surface level or at the LF level. The case of 
surface level saturation is furnished by indexical expressions properly called, while 
the case of saturation operating at the LF level is given by alleged context-sensitive 
expressions (e.g. ‘tall’, ‘red’, ‘ready’, ‘all the students’, etc.)  which do not fall under 
the traditional category of indexical expressions. The value of each context-sensitive 
term is thus determined in a similar way to the value of an indexical expression. 
 The main problem with indexicalism is that it intellectualizes ordinary 
communication. In an intuitive (albeit, of course, revisable) picture of 
communication, the hearer understands the speaker’s utterance insofar as she grasps 
the same (or at least similar) propositions. This is true also of indexical utterances. If 
Jane, addressing Jon, says: 
 
 (5) Today I am happy 
 
Jon understands what Jane says insofar as he comes to know that “I” stands for Jane 
while “today” stands for the relevant day, say Monday, October 31, 2005 and, 
therefore, he grasps the proposition that Jane is happy on Monday, October 31, 2005. 
In other words, if one does not know the value of an indexical one does not 
understand the utterance containing it. To be sure, a competent speaker could 
interpret the relevant utterance and come to entertain a thought she could express by 
“The agent of this token was happy when s/he wrote it”. This interpretation, based on 
the knowledge of linguistic rules governing the use of the indexical, cannot be, 
properly speaking, considered to be an understanding of the relevant utterance. This 
should not be surprising insofar as indexical expressions can be viewed as terms 
whose proper function is to exploit contextual aspects in order to anchor language and 
thought to specific items in our surroundings. In other words, there is what we call an 
identification constraint on the understanding of indexical utterances: in order to 
understand such utterances, one must identify the semantic values that the indexical 
expressions have in their context of utterance.5 
                                                                                                                                            
bound by, and so its value covaries with, “All around England”, while in “Every time Jon visits Paris 
he meets the local jazz guitarists”, “local” works like an anaphoric pronoun, suggesting that Jon meets 
the jazz guitarists living in or around Paris. Similar examples can be constructed with “enemy”, 
“foreigner” and the like, while they cannot be generated with terms like “tall”, “red”, and the like. In, 
for instance, “At each farm Jon visited all the tomatoes were red”, the value of “red” does not depend 
on (and does not covary with) the farms Jon visited. This can further be highlighted by the different 
behaviors of “local” and “red” in “In each market John visited, all the tomatoes were red/local”. 
Furthermore, contextuals unlike other terms can have a strict and sloppy reading when appearing in 
elliptical contexts such as: “Jane saw a local doctor and so did Mary” which can mean that Mary saw a 
doctor located in Jane’s neighborhood (strict reading) or one located in Mary’s neighborhood (sloppy 
reading). On the other hand, a sentence like “Jane ate a red tomato and so did Mary” can have only the 
strict reading interpretation, i.e. that Mary eats a red tomato. 
5 Adopting Russell’s terminology we could say that one understands the utterance of an indexical 
insofar as one is acquainted with the value of the indexical. To be acquainted with a relevant day or 
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 Now the identification constraint does not seem to apply to proper names, at least 
in the way it applies to bona fide indexical expressions. One need not know who 
Aristotle is in order to understand an utterance containing “Aristotle”. Besides, what 
does it mean to know who Aristotle is? Does one need to be able to tell him apart 
from other individuals? Does it mean to possess some information applying only to 
him?6 
 An analogous point holds for terms like “red” or “tall”. If they were to work like 
indexicals, their extension would vary according to the context in which they occur. 
Thus one would understand an utterance containing “red” or “tall” only insofar as one 
would identify the exact extension of “red” and “tall” as they appear in the relevant 
utterance. Now suppose Jon utters: 
 
 (6) Jane is too tall 
 
What is the proposition expressed by Jon’s utterance? In the indexicalist view, it 
cannot be the minimal proposition that Jane is too tall. It may be the proposition that 
Jane is too tall to play with Jon’s kids. Or it may be the proposition that Jane is too 
tall to dance with Shorty, or the proposition that Jane is too tall to attend Jon’s party, 
and so on. In each case, the extension of “tall” will probably be different.7 We can 
raise two questions here. First, how does the hearer manage to identify the non-
minimal proposition expressed by Jon’s utterance? Second, how does Jon, the 
speaker, manage to express such a proposition to begin with? 
 The standard indexicalist view is that “tall” in (6) comes with a covert variable, 
something like “tall relative to standard x”. In contrast to the case of overt 
indexicality, there is nothing in the linguistic meaning of the sentence “Jane is too 
                                                                                                                                            
person, one need not necessarily have to know the name of that person and the relevant date. One can 
understand your saying “Today I am happy” even if one does not know who you are (simply perceiving 
you suffices) or which day it is (simply being that day would be enough). See also Korta and Perry 
(this volume), who emphasize the distinction between being able to express a proposition because one 
knows the semantic values of the indexicals, and merely being able to give an utterance-bound or 
reflexive characterization of the proposition because one only has access to the token-reflexive rules 
associated with the expressions. 
6 For a detailed discussion on the difference between indexicals and proper names and how the latter do 
not reduce to the former, see Corazza (2004: ch.1). Roughly, proper names and indexicals are different 
linguistic tools and their differences reflect on some epistemological constraints accompanying their 
use. Proper names, unlike indexicals, for instance are typically used to refer to objects that are not in 
the perceptual field of the discussants. One can thus successfully participate in a linguistic interchange 
event if one is not directly acquainted with the individual referred to by a proper name. It would be 
more difficult to participate in a discussion involving an indexical, say “that woman in the corner”, if 
one is not acquainted with the relevant woman, i.e. if one is not capable of singling out the relevant 
woman.  
7 We take the extension of “tall” to be the set of objects to which the predicate “tall” applies in the 
relevant context. One of the referees pointed out that an indexicalist can take the extension of “tall” to 
be a constant function from a standard to a function. For instance, the argument of the function may be 
the standard height of a basketball player and its value the function from objects to truth-values 
expressed by “tall for a basketball player”. It is not clear that this alternative view still deserves to be 
called “indexicalist”, at least with respect to “tall”. On any indexicalist view, there has to be some 
pronoun or covert variable referring to a standard in a given context.  
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tall” which could orient the hearer to the relevant standard of tallness. Still, the latter 
is a contextual parameter that she must identify or make explicit in order to 
understand the utterance. How does such an identification proceed? A common 
answer is that the hearer must look for the intentions of the speaker, by way of 
reading his mind. 
 There is no doubt that sophisticated communication demands a lot of mind-
reading. However, there are also simple but common situations in which one can 
understand an utterance such as (6) without making explicit the intentions of the 
speaker. For instance, the hearer might react to Jon’s utterance by just letting Jane 
play with Peter’s kids, who are taller than Jon’s. Alternatively, she might encourage 
Jane to dance with someone taller than Shorty, or to dissuade her from attending 
Jon’s party, and so on. The hearer might do any of these things without engaging in 
mind-reading or making explicit exactly what standard of tallness is in question in the 
relevant context. The hearer has correctly understood the speaker (and accepted what 
he said) even though no specific standard of tallness has come to her mind. If she 
were asked “In what respect is Jane too tall?”, after some reflection she might come 
up with different and perhaps incompatible answers. The point here is rather intuitive: 
the relevant standard of tallness might be in the world rather than in the minds of the 
speaker and hearer. It might be in the world in the sense that it is determined by the 
situations of the discussants, including their low-level dispositions to take appropriate 
action given the context’s requirements. The relevant standard of tallness might not 
be fully represented by either speaker or hearer; it might even be wrongly 
represented. From the point of view of reacting to the speaker’s utterance, mind-
reading can be a distraction rather than the key to understanding. 
 Consider another example. Imagine that Jane is asked to buy some red melons. 
Jane goes to the market and comes home with the right kind of melons. At no point, 
though, does it cross Jane’s mind whether the redness of the melons concerned the 
melons’ pulp or their skin. (She would probably be surprised should the issue be 
brought up.) Jane fully understood the order and executed it without having to 
entertain or grasp the proposition expressed by a sentence like “Melons are red on the 
inside/outside”. 
 Moreover, it is a mistake to think that the proposition expressed by (6) depends on 
the intention of the speaker to say something true about Jon’s kids, Shorty or the 
party. Actually, the speaker might have no such intention in mind. For instance, Jon 
might just repeat something he has just heard. We might say that in such a case, Jon 
does not fully understand what he is saying, so that he does not express a complete 
proposition. Alternatively, one might say that he is expressing a proposition which 
depends on the intentions of other speakers, in a kind of deferential way. We do not 
find any of these alternatives plausible, at least as a general account of linguistic 
understanding. Minimalism puts forward a much simpler hypothesis. Two people 
understand each other insofar as they come to entertain or grasp the same minimal 
proposition, in our example the proposition that Jane is too tall. Of course there can 
be misunderstanding between them in other respects, but it should not come from the 
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hearer’s having failed to grasp what the speaker said. As we shall see, though, the 
proposition shared by speaker and hearer, namely that Jane is too tall, is situated, 
which means that it can have different truth-values in different situations. 
 In short, contrary to what indexicalists claim, there is generally no identification 
constraint on the understanding of utterances such as “Jane is too tall” and “Melons 
are red”, relative to standards of tallness or redness. One need introduce neither 
hidden variables (in the speaker’s mind) nor complicated modes of presentation (in 
the hearer’s mind) in order to explain the success of communication. 
 Another attack on minimalism comes from so-called contextualists.8 
Contextualists differ from indexicalists insofar as they do not posit at the level of 
logical form variables working like hidden indexicals. Contextualists embrace free 
enrichment.9 Their main argument rests on the claim that minimalism does not 
account for the fact that utterances of (6) [Jane is too tall] are not guaranteed to have 
the same truth-value (in a given world): in some circumstances, utterances of (6) may 
be true, but in other circumstances, they may be false. If Jane’s tallness concerns her 
being a jockey the utterance may be true, while if it regards Jane being a basketball 
player it may be false. The contextualist story goes as follows: what an utterance of 
(6) expresses depends on the context in which it occurs. In the jockey situation it 
expresses the proposition that Jane is too tall [for a jockey] while in the basketball 
context it expresses the proposition that Jane is too tall [for a basketball player]. The 
bracketed information entering the proposition expressed is contextually supplied. 
Thus an utterance of (6) is underdetermined and the relevant context furnishes the 
comparison class with respect to which Jane’s tallness is evaluated. It is important to 
notice that this comparison class ends up in the proposition expressed without being 
determined by some element appearing in the logical form of the relevant sentence: it 
ends up in the proposition expressed via a process of free enrichment.10 
 We do not claim that all contextualists draw the line between saturation and free 
enrichment in the same way. A contextualist like Recanati, for instance, would not 
handle the case of (6) [Jane is too tall] in terms of enrichment. Since, according to 
him, the contextually supplied information is mandatory, we have rather a case of 
saturation.11 Be that as it may, our position differs from both indexicalism and 
                                                 
8 The list of the friends of contextualism is almost endless. Among recent versions of contextualism we 
can mention: Bezuidenhout (2002), Carston (2002) and Recanati (2004). The parents of modern 
contextualism are: Searle (1978; 1980) Sperber and Wilson (1986), Travis (1985, 1989). 
9 The chief exponents of free enrichment are the relevance theorists (Sperber and Wilson 1986, Carston 
2002). Recanati (2004) and Bach (1994), though in different ways, embrace free enrichment as well. 
10 As we shall see later we do not deny that the comparison class plays a role when we come to 
compute the truth value of the utterance. Unlike the contextualists (and the indexicalists), though, we 
argue that it does not enter as a constituent of the proposition expressed. 
11 Recanati’s argument is the following. We have a case of enrichment only if it is possible to have 
circumstances in which a sentence expresses a complete proposition without appealing to contextual 
information. That is, if a sentence like “Jane is too tall” can express a full proposition without having to 
encompass what Jane is too tall for we would have free enrichment when the contextual information 
concerning what Jane is too tall for is relevant and enters the proposition expressed. Since we cannot 
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contextualism (whatever extension is given to free enrichment) insofar as we do not 
commit ourselves to the view that the alleged contextual information enters the 
proposition expressed. 
 A similar story can be told about utterances of “Melons are red”. The context 
should determine whether it expresses the proposition that melons are red [inside] or 
that melons are red [on their surface/skin]. Following the contextualists, only such 
enriched propositions can be evaluated as being either true or false (relative to a 
possible world). 
 In our view, contextualism faces difficulties similar to indexicalism’s. In 
particular, it saddles understanding with too much cognitive burden. Our point is not 
merely that speaker and hearer rarely, perhaps never, come to enrich a proposition in 
the same way and, therefore, rarely entertain the very same proposition. At least some 
contextualists acknowledge this point, arguing that communication does not rest on 
two people grasping the very same proposition: 
 
It seems to us neither paradoxical nor counterintuitive to say that there are thoughts 
[propositions] that we cannot exactly share, and that communication can be successful 
without resulting in an exact duplication of thoughts in communicator and audience. 
(Sperber, and Wilson 1986: 193) 
 
Along this line one can argue that two people understand each other insofar as they 
grasp similar propositions. All the potential enriched propositions share the same 
minimal proposition—in our examples that Jane is too tall or that melons are red. 
Contextualists appealing to either free enrichment or saturation seem committed to the 
view that understanding rests on the grasping of the minimal proposition and some 
extra contextual aspect coming to enrich it. The latter is likely to vary between the 
proposition (if any) intended by the speaker and the one (if any) grasped by the 
audience. Yet for understanding and communication to succeed, the enrichment must 
be similar enough. How similar it must be, though, remains unspecified. As far as the 
success of understanding is concerned, minimalism may be a more economical 
position. The point is that understanding does not depend on there being a unique set 
of similar, enriched propositions. Perhaps the speaker has no enriched proposition in 
mind, and in many cases, the hearer can understand the utterance without even trying 
to identify the relevant extra parameters. 
 A further argument aiming to undermine minimalism can be summarized as 
follows. Since minimal propositions do not play any cognitive role, they are 
dispensable. Carston (2002) and Recanati (2004) go as far as claiming that since we 
cannot imagine how minimal propositions could play a cognitive role in human 
psychology, they are not only spurious, they simply do not exist. Following this view, 
only enriched propositions, the ones the speaker and/or hearer are consciously aware 
                                                                                                                                            
imagine a situation in which “Jane is too tall” expresses a complete proposition, we have a case of 
saturation, i.e., the information what Jane is too tall for is semantically mandatory. 
 10
of having expressed, exist and enter the scene.12 Thus only enriched propositions, i.e., 
the ones that informed speakers allegedly grasp, have psychological reality and can 
thus be considered to be what is expressed by the utterance of a given sentence. 
 Although the criticisms we have formulated against indexicalism and 
contextualism may not be devastating,13 we believe that they contribute to 
undermining these two positions. We also believe that one can propose a version of 
minimalism (we could call it situationalism14 or situated minimalism) which, along 
with avoiding the criticisms addressed, on the one hand, against the indexicalist and 
the contextualist positions and, on the other hand, against the original minimalist 
position, can incorporate the powerful intuitions underlying such opposing viewpoints 
as contextualism and minimalism. 
 
 
3. Situating Minimalism 
 
As we anticipated, contextualism rests on what we take to be powerful intuitions 
concerning an utterance’s truth-value.15 For instance, it goes against our intuitions to 
claim that an utterance of (6) [Jane is too tall] is true/false unrestrictedly. If (6) occurs 
in the jockey situation it is likely to be true, while if it occurs in the basketball 
situation it is likely to be false. Similar examples can be furnished with “red”, 
“ready”, “strong”, “old”, etc.16 In taking on board the contextualist intuitions we, 
therefore, depart from Cappelen and Lepore’s version of minimalism. Yet, we do not 
think that we are committed to what Cappelen and Lepore characterize as the 
Mistaken Assumption, i.e.: 
 
A theory of semantic content is adequate just in case it accounts for all or most of the 
intuitions speakers have about speech act content, i.e., intuitions about what speakers say, 
assert, claim, and state by uttering sentences. (Cappelen and Lepore 2005: 53) 
 
                                                 
12 Recanati’s availability principle attempts to capture this fact. Recanati claims that the proposition 
expressed (what is said) corresponds to what a normal speaker/interpreter would say it expresses. 
Recanati’s normal interpreter, though, faces overwhelming difficulties. Actually, since Recanati’s 
normal interpreter, like God, but unlike us, would never make errors, Recanati’s contextualist theory 
turns out to be a non-empirical one (see Davis 2005). In short, since the normal interpreter is the one 
ultimately determining the proposition expressed and since this interpreter never makes mistakes in 
interpreting what one says, Recanati’s theory cannot be disconfirmed. For this very reason, as Davis 
aptly points out, it cannot be an empirical theory. 
13 For further criticism of these positions see Cappelen and Lepore (2005: chs. 2-9) 
14 See Corazza (forthcoming). 
15 For a detailed discussion and some scepticism on how speakers’ intuitions can shape semantics see 
Bach (2002).  
16 Contextualists like Searle, Travis, Sperber and Wilson, Recanati, Carston, etc. propose many 
examples where a change in the context allegedly entails a change in the truth conditions, which in fact 
we see as a truth-value change. 
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Insofar as we distinguish, unlike the contextualists and the indexicalists, between the 
proposition expressed and the situation according to which it obtains a truth-value, we 
do not commit ourselves to the view that the semantic content of an utterance (the 
proposition expressed) must account for all the intuitions that speakers may have 
concerning a specific utterance. Within our framework these intuitions are captured 
by the situation in which the proposition expressed is evaluated. In a nutshell, we are 
minimalists with respect to the proposition expressed and contextualists with respect 
to the truth-values. 
 We think that the friends of both contextualism and minimalism fail to appreciate 
how a given utterance can be said to be true/false in two very distinct ways. That is to 
say, an utterance u of “Jane is too tall”, for instance, can be true in two main ways: (i) 
if it expresses the proposition that Jane is too tall [for a jockey] or (ii) if it expresses 
the proposition that Jane is too tall but the latter’s truth-value depends on the 
discourse situation/context/circumstance/… in which it occurs. While contextualists 
favoring free enrichment (and, in a different way, indexicalists positing a hidden 
indexical) embrace the first option, we embrace the second one. 
 If one follows the first path, one can accept the traditional (semantic) view that a 
proposition is true/false objectively and eternally. It follows that for a proposition to 
be true/false eternally it must be completed or enriched.17 
 On the other hand, if one follows the second path, a given proposition can change 
truth-value with a change of the context/circumstance in which it occurs. Truth as an 
attribute of propositions becomes, pace the traditional semantic position, a relativized 
notion. 
 Along with the contextualists, minimalists like Cappelen and Lepore hold the 
view that an utterance expresses a proposition which is true or false regardless of the 
situation in which it occurs. In short, both minimalists and contextualists embrace the 
following theorem: 
 
 (7) S is true iff p 
 
where the proposition that p gives the truth conditions of the (non-indexical) sentence 
S. (7) can easily be rephrased in terms of utterances: 
 
(8) If u is an utterance of S, then [u is true iff p]18 
                                                 
17 As Frege puts it (speaking of thoughts where we speak of propositions): “Now is a thought 
changeable or is it timeless? The thought we express by the Pythagorean Theorem is surely timeless, 
eternal, unvarying. ‘But are there not thoughts which are true today but false in six months’ time? The 
thought, for example, that the tree there is covered with green leaves, will surely be false in six month’s 
time’. No, for it is not the same thought at all. The words ‘This tree is covered with green leaves’ are 
not sufficient by themselves to constitute the expression of thought, for the time of utterance is 
involved as well. Without the time-specification thus given we have not a complete thought, i.e., we 
have no thought at all. Only a sentence with the time-specification filled out, a sentence complete in 
every respect, expresses a thought, if it is true, is true not only today or tomorrow but timelessly” 
(Frege 1918: 53). Since truth-values can shift across possible worlds, the world should be specified as 
well. It is interesting to note, though, that everybody is a relativist with respect to possible worlds. 
 12
 
The difference between contextualists and minimalists concerns the nature of the 
proposition p. While the former assume that p is an enriched proposition, the 
minimalist assumes that when S does not contain indexical expressions, p is 
automatically obtained via a disquotational process. If our sentence S corresponds to 
(6) [Jane is too tall], the contextualists would thus represent its truth conditions as 
follows: 
 
(9) If u is an utterance of “Jane is too tall”, then [u is true iff Jane is too tall [for a 
jockey]] 
 
On the other hand, minimalists like Cappelen and Lepore could represent (6)’s truth 
conditions as follows: 
 
(10) If u is an utterance of “Jane is too tall”, then [u is true iff Jane is too tall] 
 
Both representations are unsatisfactory insofar as: (i) a contextualist representation 
like (9) in appealing to an enriched proposition makes communication more difficult 
than it should be, from a cognitive point of view, and (ii) a minimalist representation 
like (10) fails to capture the contextualist intuition that the proposition that Jane is too 
tall can be true when evaluated vis-à-vis the jockey situation, while false when 
evaluated vis-à-vis the basketball situation. 
 As situated minimalists, we agree with Cappelen and Lepore that the truth 
condition of any utterance of S is always the same minimal proposition, for instance 
that p. However, in contrast to the latter, we do not consider theorems such as (7) and 
(8) to be automatically true. (7) will be guaranteed to be true only if the situation in 
which it is uttered coincides with the situation in which S itself is uttered. Suppose, 
for instance, that S is uttered in a situation in which what is relevant to the truth-value 
of the utterance is whether or not Jane is too tall to play with Jon’s kids (she is). Now 
theorem (7) will be false if uttered in a different situation in which the proposition 
that Jane is too tall is itself false, perhaps because what is relevant in the latter 
situation is whether or not Jane is too tall to dance with Shorty (she isn’t). Similarly, 
(8) will be false if there are utterances which are situated in relevantly different ways 
than the theorem itself. From the point of view of situated minimalism, (11) is a better 
theorem as far as (6) is concerned: 
 
                                                                                                                                            
18 This formulation is borrowed from Higginbotham (1988). For a detailed discussion of it see Carston 
(2002: 50ff). This representation allows us to capture indexicality. Actually, to accommodate indexical 
expressions our theorem could be rephrased as: 
 (i) If u is an utterance of “I am F” and x is the agent of u, then [u is true iff x is F] 
 (ii)  If u is an utterance of “He/she is F”, and the agent of u refers to x with ‘he/she’, then [u is true 
iff x is F] 
 
 13
 (11) If u is an utterance of “Jane is too tall” and s is the situation in which u 
occurs, then [u is true iff Jane is too tall relative to s] 
 
This is because (11) will be true whatever the situation in which it is uttered. It allows 
for the truth value of (6) to depend on the situation in which the minimal proposition 
it expresses (namely that Jane is too tall) is evaluated. If the minimal proposition is 
evaluated vis-à-vis the jockey situation (6) is likely to turn out to be true, while if the 
minimal proposition is evaluated vis-à-vis the basketball situation it is likely to be 
false.19 
 In a nutshell, minimalism meets contextualism. That is, like the minimalists and 
unlike the contextualists, we maintain that the proposition expressed encodes only 
information triggered by the sentence’s literal meaning. Like contextualists and unlike 
minimalists, we assume that an utterance’s truth-value is not context invariant. Our 
proposal, though, comes with a price: unlike minimalists and contextualists, we reject 
the view that an utterance’s truth-value is absolute. Our position is committed to the 
view that truth (as an attribute of propositions) is a relative notion depending on the 
situation in which the (minimal) proposition is evaluated. This allows us to 
accommodate the powerful contextualist intuition that it does not make much sense to 
say that “Jane is too tall” can be true/false regardless of the specific situation in which 
it occurs and/or with respect to which it is evaluated. In other words, our position does 
not succumb to the contextualist charge that it does not make sense to evaluate 
propositions such as that Naomi Campbell is very rich, that Jon is strong, that Jeff is 
too old, etc. with respect to, for instance, the actual world (ignoring standards of 
evaluation or situations). Naomi Campbell is, no doubt, very rich if compared with the 
authors of this paper. Yet she’s not that rich if compared to the likes of Roman 
Abramovich or Bill Gates. 
 
 
4. Evading Some Contextualist and Minimalist Charges 
 
One of the (many) advantages of the position we are putting forward is that it is not 
vulnerable to the main criticisms Cappelen and Lepore mount against contextualism. 
The chief criticism they offer runs as follows: contextualism cannot account for the 
fact that people can share content across contexts. If, for instance, in context C Jon 
utters: 
 
(12) Melons are red 
 
                                                 
19 Of course there is a sense in which (11) captures the conditions under which (6) is true. This is not 
the sense of “truth conditions” that we are working with in this paper. In our terminology, the truth 
conditions of an utterance is just the proposition expressed, i.e. what is grasped by the competent 
speaker/hearer. When Jon says “Jane is too tall”, he does not have to identify the situation of his 
utterance; he is just in it. So (11) should not be taken to imply that the situation s gets inside the 
proposition expressed by “Jane is too tall” in a given context. 
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intending to indicate that melons are red in the inside, and in context C* Jeff says: 
 
(13) Melons are red 
 
indicating that they are red on their surface, the contextualist is committed to the view 
that (12) and (13) express different propositions. The contextualist is thus unable to 
account for the intuition that it is legitimate to claim that both Jon and Jeff said the 
same thing. Actually, if one hearing (12) and (13) is asked “What did Jon and Jeff 
say?” a plausible answer would be: 
 
 (14) Jon and Jeff both said that melons are red   
 
This implies that there is a level of content that Jon and Jeff share. This similarity of 
content is captured by the minimal proposition that melons are red expressed by both 
(12) and (13). Since contextualists, and indexicalists, are committed to the view that 
(12) and (13) express different propositions, say that melons are red inside and that 
melons are red on the surface respectively, (14) could never be, contrary to our 
intuition, an appropriate reply: it would never be true. 
 Note that the problem cannot be circumvented by claiming that (14) involves a 
neutral notion of redness which encompasses both Jon’s and Jeff’s more specific 
notions. For Jon can say the following: 
 
 (15) Melons are red. That’s also what Jeff said 
 
which is true, although Jon still intends to say that melons are red in the inside.20 
 Furthermore, if one adopted the contextualist position and argued that terms like 
“tall” and “red” are context sensitive, one would be committed to the view that 
 
 (16) London buses and tomatoes are red 
 (17) Jon and Jane are tall 
 
could rarely be true since “red” and “tall”, being context sensitive expressions, do not 
have the same extension when applying to London buses and tomatoes, and to Jane 
and Jon respectively. 
 On the other hand, our position also resists some of the criticism that a 
contextualist can mount against minimalism. In particular, it is immune to a criticism 
proposed by Recanati (2004: 92-3). Recanati aims to undermine what may be labeled 
unrestricted minimalism, i.e., the view that a minimal proposition is true/false 
                                                 
20 It may be worth mentioning that some indexical utterances also allow elliptical interpretation. 
Consider Jane saying “I am tired” and Jeff saying “I am tired. That’s also what Jane said”. Jeff’s 
“That’s also what Jane said” can be interpreted either as meaning that Jane said that Jeff is tired or that 
Jane said that she herself is tired. With (15), though, we do not face this ambiguity. The “That’s also 
what Jeff said” in (15) can mean only that Jeff said that melons are red. 
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regardless of the situation in which it occurs. If one, like Cappelen and Lepore, 
embraces unrestricted minimalism, one may be said to know the truth conditions of a 
sentence in merely disquotational terms. That is, one would automatically know that: 
 
(18) “Jane is tall” is true iff Jane is tall 
 (19) “Melons are red” is true iff melons are red 
 
This knowledge of the truth conditions of a sentence merely amounts to a kind of pure 
disquotational knowledge. This, though, cannot seriously count as knowledge insofar 
as one would be said to know that: 
 
 (20) “Grounglys blot tranglings” is true iff Grounglys blot tranglings 
 
Yet we would not say that one knows, let alone understands, what 
 
 (21) Grounglys blot tranglings 
 
means. The mere knowledge of a disquotational theorem of the form “‘S’ is true iff S” 
cannot count as knowledge of what S means. Hence, the knowledge of a 
disquotational theorem like (18)/(19) cannot be taken as a good guide to the 
knowledge or mastery of a language. Yet we would like to say that knowledge of a 
sentence’s truth conditions should constitute a good guide to what amounts to 
knowledge of a language. It could be that this argument cannot, pace Recanati, be 
used to undermine the minimalist proposal. For, a minimalist could claim that since a 
competent speaker does not understand (21) or its constituents s/he does not 
understand the right-hand side of (20). That is to say, all what a competent speaker of 
English (i.e., who understands “true”, “iff”, and the conventions of quotation) can 
know is that (20) expresses a truth if it expresses anything. Be that as it might be, 
Recanati’s criticism does not apply to our version of minimalism. For one may be said 
to understand what (21) means only insofar as one is able (at least in principle) to 
situate it. Since there is no way one can situate (21), there is no way one can be said to 
understand it. 
 Our point can be put in the following way. Anyone who has genuine knowledge 
of (18) and (19) (in the appropriate situation; see our remarks about such theorems in 
the previous section) can in principle derive new, more complex theorems such as the 
following: 
 
(22) “Jane is too tall” is true in s iff Jane is too tall relative to the standards of s 
(23) “Melons are red” is true in s iff melons count as red in s 
 
These theorems make explicit something that was only implicit in (18)/(19), namely 
the situations relative to which the propositions that Jane is too tall and that melons 
are red are to be evaluated (s can be thought of as specifying a particular situation, or 
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as a variable bound by a universal quantifier). In contrast, one cannot derive from (21) 
the following: 
 
(24) “Grounglys blot tranglings” is true in s iff Grounglys blot tranglings relative 
to s 
 
whose right-hand side clearly does not make sense. Now if (24) does not make sense, 
(21) is not a genuine theorem either. 
 As such, of course, (22) and (23) introduce other, more sophisticated propositions, 
namely the propositions that Jane is too tall relative to the standards of a situation s 
and that melons count as red in a situation s. No doubt, a competent speaker knows 
that “Jane is too tall” can be true in a given situation while false in some other. The 
same with melons: “Melons are red” is true when speaking about the melons’ pulp, 
while false when speaking about their skin (the melons we know have green skin), 
and so on and so forth. These more sophisticated propositions—i.e. the propositions 
which explicitly specify the relevant situation or simply present a bound variable for a 
situation—may come close to what Perry characterizes as the reflexive truth 
conditions of an utterance, i.e. the truth conditions generated by the utterance meaning 
(see Perry 2001). In the case of an indexical utterance u like “I am having fun” (said 
by Jane on October 22 2005) its reflexive truth conditions correspond to the 
proposition expressed by “The agent of u is/was having fun at the time of u”. Each 
competent speaker can grasp these truth conditions.21 Yet to understand the indexical 
utterance one needs to grasp, Perry claims, the incremental truth conditions or official 
content, i.e. the proposition that Jane was having fun on October 22, 2005. We agree 
with Perry. The understanding of an indexical utterance rests on the grasping of the 
official content and thus on the identification of the indexical’s referent. We do not 
claim, though, that the understanding of an utterance like “Jane is too tall” or “Melons 
are red” one needs to transcend theorems like (22)— i.e.: “Jane is too tall” is true in s 
iff Jane is too tall relative to the standards of s. In other words, we do not commit 
ourselves with the existence of some incremental truth conditions one needs to grasp 
in order to understand the utterance. In short, following Perry we distinguish between 
reflexivity and indexicality, i.e. between what is said using an utterance with an 
indexical and the identifying conditions at work when reference gets fixed. But we do 
not commit ourselves with the view that some identifying condition of a given 
situation must be at work when one utters/understands a sentence like “Melons are 
red” or “Jane is too tall”: “red” and “tall” are not indexicals picking out a given 
situation. Nor the utterance as a whole presents some hidden indexical selecting the 
relevant situation. 
 
 
                                                 
21 We could also say that the reflexive truth conditions belong to the sphere of tacit knowledge. The 
latter are what enable one to master a language. 
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5. Situated Minimalism vs. Speech Act Pluralism  
 
To deal with the kind of worries put forward by the contextualists, Cappelen and 
Lepore appeal to Speech Act Pluralism.22 That is the view that: 
 
[W]hat an utterance says, states, claims, etc. differs from the proposition it semantically 
expresses. (Cappelen and Lepore 2005: 190)  
 
Roughly, Cappelen and Lepore embrace the views that: (i) the utterance of a given 
sentence can express, in principle, infinitely many propositions and (ii) the speaker 
(and the audience) need not be aware of most of the propositions expressed. 
Furthermore: 
 
[T]o ascertain what’s said, you first have to reconstruct utterances to a point where they 
express thoughts. There are many ways to achieve this end ... No one way is uniquely 
correct. (Cappelen and Lepore 2005: 192)  
 
Cappelen and Lepore agree with the contextualist appealing to free enrichment that 
what is said transcends the minimal (semantic) proposition expressed. In other words, 
the proposition(s) communicated (what is said) differs from the minimal proposition 
semantically expressed. Among the infinitely many propositions expressed, one is the 
minimal proposition, but this proposition is not what can explain successful 
communication. The minimal proposition is the only semantically pertinent 
proposition, but communication must be explained by appealing to some of the 
infinitely many propositions pragmatically expressed. Although Speech Act Pluralism 
differs from contextualism in arguing that many propositions get expressed, it 
nonetheless comes close to contextualism in committing itself to the view that at least 
one of the many propositions expressed should capture the speaker’s mental content. 
This proposition looks pretty much like the contextualists’ enriched proposition.23 
 Minimalists and contextualists share the same motivation in positing rich mental 
representations: they want to explain our intuitions about the truth-values of our 
utterances. When Jon says that Jane is too tall, his utterance is made true, in his 
                                                 
22 Cappelen and Lepore recognize that Speech Act Pluralism is not a theory. It merely amounts to a 
collection of observations, for no systematic theory can be furnished about speech act content. 
23 It goes without saying that a contextualist and a Speech Act Pluralist could argue that enriched 
propositions need not be internalized, i.e. that one need not have a mental representation matching the 
complexity of the enriched proposition. (Note that we are not using the notion of mental representation 
in a way which implies the Language of Thought Hypothesis. Perhaps one can mentally represent 
something without tokening a mental symbol of that thing.) We think that if enriched propositions are 
not represented, then they do not play, pace contextualism and Speech Act Pluralism, an interesting 
cognitive role. In short, why should one posit enriched propositions or embrace Speech Act Pluralism 
in order to explain communication if the (enriched) propositions expressed do not get fully represented, 
one way or the other, by the speaker and her audience? Recanati’s availability principle requires that 
the normal, fully informed, interpreter have a mental representation of the relevant enriched 
proposition. 
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situation, by the fact that Jane is too tall to play with his kids. But when Shorty says 
the same thing, his utterance is false, because in his situation what is relevant is 
whether Jane is or isn’t too tall to dance with him (she isn’t). In such a case, there is 
the same minimal proposition, or semantic content, corresponding to the sentence 
“Jane is too tall”, but two truth-values. How is such plurality of truth-values possible 
within the same world? The minimalist and contextualist answer is that there must be 
two different absolute mental representations, which one could express by the 
sentences “Jane is too tall to play with Jon’s kids”, and “Jane is too tall to dance with 
Shorty”. These representations are absolute in the sense that they are not true or false 
relative to standards of tallness, since a specific value of tallness is already 
incorporated in the representations themselves.  
 The important take-home point is that, like contextualism, Speech Act Pluralism is 
committed to the view that the cognitive apparatus engaged in communicative 
interaction is stuffed with rich mental representations. That is, although there may be 
nothing in a given sentence representing the constituents which end up in the 
propositions expressed by an utterance, in the speaker’s mind there must be 
appropriate representations of all the relevant propositional constituents ending up in 
what is said. Within Speech Act Pluralism and the contextualist framework these 
representations play a central role when people engage in a thought episode and a 
communicative interchange. 
 We reckon that both the contextualists who appeal to enriched propositions and 
minimalists who appeal to Speech Act Pluralism fail to appreciate the insight of 
Perry’s (1986) view that some thoughts can be about something without having to 
represent that very thing, viz. that we can have, to borrow Perry’s happy phrase, 
“thoughts without representation”. The thought one expresses in uttering “It is 3:15 
PM”, for instance, concerns a certain time zone even if one does not entertain a 
representation of the relevant time zone. Here, we conform to an intuitive notion of 
representation according to which a subject entertains a representation of an entity 
(object, property, or whatever) if she grasps a concept (or any non-conceptual mode 
of presentation) of the entity. Representation is mandatory if the entity is to be 
inferentially or computationally relevant. In the case in point, no representation of a 
particular time zone is needed because the subject does not draw any inference 
hinging on the identity of time-zones: all her inferences involving the thought she 
expresses in uttering “It is 3:15 PM” take place in the same time-zone, typically the 
one she presently occupies.24 Yet the subject’s thought is anchored to a particular time 
zone. The important insight is that the gap between the thought and the time zone is 
not bridged by a representation. In the terminology we introduced before, this thought 
concerns the relevant time zone because it is situated in the relevant time zone. 
                                                 
24 For further details, see Dokic (2006a, 2006b). Dokic (2006b) suggests that there may be another, 
more relaxed notion of representation according to which the time zone would be represented, even if it 
is not inferentially relevant. The distinction Dokic draws between two kinds of representation is largely 
orthogonal to the present discussion. According to situationalism, there are thoughts without 
representation even in the relaxed notion of representation. 
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 The same idea expands, we claim, to thoughts expressed by utterances of so-called 
underdetermined sentences like: “Jane is too old”, “Melons are red”, “Naomi is rich”, 
“Jeff is ready”, etc. The thoughts expressed by utterances of these sentences may 
concern the fact that Jane is too old to play with Jon’s kids, that melons are red inside, 
that Naomi is rich compared to us, that Jeff is ready for the exam, etc. Yet, these 
thoughts need not represent what Jane is too old for, the location of melons’ redness, 
the comparative class vis-à-vis which Naomi’s richness is judged, nor what Jeff is 
ready for. In short, the situation in which one entertains a thought and expresses a 
minimal proposition need not enter the subject’s mind. This can be illustrated by an 
analogy. When one uses the first person pronoun one automatically refers to oneself. 
This is guaranteed by the semantics of “I”, whose linguistic meaning (or character) 
operates on the relevant contextual aspect, the agent, and delivers the latter as 
referent. But one need not entertain a particular representation of oneself when using 
“I” (although of course one could). The mere fact of using it suffices for the agent to 
pick up herself as referent and to think about herself. A similar process is at work 
when one uses so-called underdetermined utterances. The simple fact of entertaining 
them suffices to have thoughts and express propositions concerning the situations in 
which they occur. One need not entertain a representation of the relevant situation in 
order for one’s thought and the (minimal) proposition expressed to be situated in that 
situation. Facts about the speaker such as her location, her identity, the topic of the 
discourse, perhaps other participants in the linguistic community, etc. suffice to 
determine the relevant situation in which a thought occurs. This is, at least partly, 
determined by the fact that the speakers are embodied individuals—that is, by the fact 
that speakers are necessarily embodied in a given context. This embodiment, though, 
need not be encapsulated into the speaker’s cognitive apparatus. In arguing that the 
thoughts expressed by so-called underdetermined utterances—like the minimal 
propositions expressed—are situated, we commit ourselves to the view that lots of our 
thoughts are anchored to a situation by factors which are not explicitly represented in 
the speakers’ minds. 
 As far as communication is concerned, two people understand each other insofar 
as they grasp the same minimal proposition (and thus come to entertain the same 
minimal thought).25 This is the case even if the speaker’s and hearer’s situations are 
relevantly different. For example, suppose that the minimal proposition (and the 
thought) expressed by Jane’s utterance of  “Jeff is ready” concerns the situation in 
which Jeff is ready for the party while we implicitly take it to concern the situation in 
which Jeff is ready for the exam. There is an important sense in which we understand 
Jane’s utterance: we correctly take her to announce that Jeff is ready. 
 In another, non-semantic sense, there is misunderstanding between Jane and us. 
What is the source of this misunderstanding? We should remember that 
communication is a dynamic process in which agreement between speaker and hearer 
                                                 
25 As we shall soon see, this is a necessary but not sufficient condition for understanding in the ordinary 
sense, for if two people are not embodied in the same situation (non-semantic) misunderstanding can 
occur. 
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should eventually prevail over disagreement. That is, disagreement makes sense only 
against a background of things commonly agreed by speaker and hearer. If we 
implicitly take Jane to be talking about Jeff’s exam, then the risk is that as 
communication goes on, disagreement will grow to the point of unintelligibility: for 
instance, we would not understand why Jane wants Jeff to work on his math after the 
party. If he is ready for the exam, why should he go on studying? Global 
disagreement is likely to be manifested in an unsuccessful joint activity and/or in our 
puzzlement about some behavioral output. 
 Thus, even if, at any given time, the fact that speakers and hearers associate the 
same minimal propositions with the relevant utterances is a sufficient condition of 
successful communication, the fact that they share a situation (that they are co-
situated) is the key to global agreement over time. Indeed, in face-to-face 
communication we occupy the same relevant context (location, time, possible world) 
and we share the same situation (we come to our interchange with the background of 
a set of common beliefs and expectations). Most of the time this simple fact suffices 
for the dynamic success of our communicative interchanges: we successfully engage 
in joint attentional activities, our behavioral output conforms to expectations, and so 
on and so forth. It should be as simple as that. 
 We are reflective creatures, and when we feel that something has gone wrong in a 
communicative exchange, we tend to make explicit the situation of the speaker. In 
doing this, we change our own situation, of course, since we form more sophisticated 
representations which are themselves situated. For example, we move from the 
proposition that melons are red to the proposition that they are red inside. The latter 
situation is no less situated than the former, although the relevant situations are 
different. The speaker might likewise adopt a reflective stance, and both speaker and 
hearer can move to a new, common situational ground. A simple question often 
suffices to trigger the recovery of a shared situation. The moral is that there is nothing 
like the situation of a communicative exchange, which changes over time to maximize 
agreement. 
 In a nutshell, the picture we are proposing, pace Cappelen and Lepore and pace 
the contextualists appealing to free enrichment, may be characterized as a 
situationalist and non-intellectualist picture of communication. 
 Our picture has affinities with versions of utterance-truth or semantic relativism to 
be found in the recent literature. For instance, Predelli (2005a, 2005b) suggests that 
utterance-truth is relative to what he calls “points of evaluation”. Predelli argues that 
from a semantic viewpoint all we have is truth-values at points. Since the 
establishment of the privileged point is relative, the truth-value of a particular 
utterance is relative to a specific point of evaluation. Thus, even though all utterances 
of “Melons are red” express the same fixed semantic content (the minimal proposition 
that melons are red), the latter can be true relative to some points of evaluation and 
false relative to others. Since points of evaluation correspond to partial situations 
rather than whole possible worlds, the latter typically underdetermine the truth-values 
of utterances occurring within them. Our account differs from Predelli’s in that we are 
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more explicit in insisting that thoughts are no less situated than utterances. Predelli 
(2005a: 365) tentatively cites “the speaker’s intentions, the topic of conversation, or 
the expectations of the conversants” as contextual factors relevant to the evaluation of 
a particular utterance as being true or false. This seems to suggest that these factors 
are somehow made explicit at the level of thought. As far as we can see this position 
can avoid positing rich mental representations in two ways: (i) the relevant contextual 
factors concurring in the determination of an utterance’s truth-value are determined 
by mental states, such as intentions, but these states do not strictly speaking represent 
the contextual factors; (ii) the relevant contextual factors are determined by non-
mental aspects of the situation. Both ways are compatible with situationalism, 
although of course in each case one must tell a more detailed story on how the 
relevant contextual factors are determined. 
 In our view, then, mental representations such as intentions and expectations are 
themselves situated. For instance, a subject can form the thought that melons are red 
in a situation in which what counts as being red is the insides of melons. The 
reflective subject can also think about this situation, and explicitly contrast it with 
other situations (including the situation in which what counts as being red is the skins 
of melons). Our point is that she can also be unreflective and fail to make explicit the 
situation relative to which her thought is to be evaluated as true or false. Perhaps the 
subject has the disposition to make her situation explicit, so that there would be a 
(dispositional) mental state determining the situation of her thought after all, but this 
disposition is itself explained by the fact that she is in a specific situation to begin 
with, rather than the other way round. 
 In a similar vein, MacFarlane (this volume) suggests a way of reconciling 
semantic minimalism with a form of relativism about truth. In MacFarlane’s view, a 
circumstance of evaluation is an ordered pair consisting of a world and what he calls a 
“counts-as” parameter. So, again, utterances of “Melons are red” always express the 
same minimal proposition (that melons are red), but may be true relative to some 
counts-as parameters (according to which what counts as being red is something about 
the insides of melons) and false relative to other counts-as parameters (according to 
which what counts as being red is something about the skins of melons). 
 MacFarlane has recently developed a more radical version of truth-relativism, 
according to which utterances are true or false relative to contexts of assessment (see, 
for instance, his 2005). Contexts of assessment may be quite external to the situations 
of speakers and hearers, since they are associated with the evaluation of utterances 
and thoughts, rather than with the contexts in which they are formed and produced. Of 
course, we agree that an utterance or a thought can be evaluated as true or false 
relative to any (appropriate) situation we like, even a situation completely external to 
the subject. For instance, if Jane utters the sentence “It’s raining” and thereby grasps 
the thought that it is raining, the latter can be evaluated as true relative to Jane’s 
situation (because it is raining where Jane is) but false relative to our situation 
(because we stand in a sunny place). However, we insist that utterances and thoughts 
are objectively situated quite independently of their semantic evaluation. In other 
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words, there is a fact of the matter as to which situation a particular utterance or 
thought is anchored on. It follows that there is a privileged context of evaluation, 
namely the situation which rationalizes the subject’s actions, inferences and 
expectations. Thus, the thought that it is raining should be evaluated with respect to its 
subject’s immediate environment in part because the success of her action depends on 
how the weather is there. 
 MacFarlane (2003) gives the case of future contingents as an illustration of his 
radical truth-relativism. A subject utters “There will be a sea battle tomorrow”, and it 
is objectively indeterminate whether there will be a sea battle the next day. The truth 
of the subject’s utterance depends on the context of assessment: it is true from the 
point of view of a future with a sea battle, false from the point of view of a future 
without a sea battle, and neither true nor false from the present point of view. In this 
case, the utterance does not seem to be anchored to a unique, objective situation. 
Perhaps this is so, and there is (objective) situation-relativity as well as truth-
relativity. However, two remarks are in order. First, the case of future contingents is 
quite special (and raises rather complicated issues), and cannot be used to ascertain 
arbitrary situation-relativity. In most case there are objective situations corresponding 
to privileged contexts of assessment. Second, the case of future contingents might be 
described in a different way. It is actually more plausible to say that the subject’s 
utterance cannot be evaluated from the present point of view. In fact, its semantic 
evaluation must wait for the next day. It does not follow that the utterance is not 
objectively situated. There is no reason to think that the relation of being situated, 
which relates an utterance to the rest of the world, is itself relative to a particular time. 
So the utterance is objectively situated, although as a matter of necessity, the subject, 
however reflective she is, cannot presently know the relevant situation. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have put forward the following claims: 
 
• Thoughts are more closely related to minimal propositions than Cappelen and 
Lepore suggest. 
 
• Objective situations play the role played by the contextualists’ enrichment 
processes and by the open set of propositions expressed by an utterance 
according to Speech Act Pluralism. 
 
• However, pace contextualists and Cappelen and Lepore, situations need not be 
mentally represented. 
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• Our position, which we call “situated minimalism” or simply “situationalism”, 
is cognitively more plausible insofar as it does not overburden our 
(communicative) minds with complex cognitive mechanisms. 
 
• Yet our position captures both the insights of contextualism and of Cappelen 
and Lepore’s minimalism. 
 
In short, propositions can be minimal because they are related to implicit situations, 
i.e. objective situations which (most of the time) fail to be mentally represented. In 
particular, we just do not need to make explicit at the level of thought the implicit 
situations of our utterances. Minimal propositions can classify both utterances and 
thoughts. We stand opposed to two alternative views. Contextualism posits 
enrichment processes, which are cognitive and representational, in order to specify 
semantic contents. Speech Act Pluralism posits rich, pragmatically expressed mental 
representations, in order to compensate for minimal semantic contents. In contrast, we 
argue that thoughts and utterances have minimal contents but are objectively related 
to non-cognitive and non-representational situations. This way, our situated 
minimalism can have the best of both worlds. 
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